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The social consequences of a zero-growth rate con­
stitutes a vast and complex subject. What I intend 
is to outline an analytical approach for consideration 
of the topic and follow this with some specific exam­
ples of the social consequences most likely to ema­
nate from a condition of zero economic growth. I 
am not going to discuss how zero economic growth 
might be either brought about or retained; my fo­
cus here will be on the consequences.
basic premises
Let me begin with some basic premises which are 
sometimes overlooked. First, I think we can all ac­
cept as a minimum goal a good standard of health 
and decency for all of mankind, obtained at a min­
imum psychological and social cost and with mini­
mum deleterious consequences for the environment. 
Among some of the world’s peoples, the attainment 
of this goal would mean a lower material level of 
living; among others, a higher material level of liv­
ing.
Second, it should be fairly obvious that not every­
thing worthwhile may be obtained in the market­
place. Friendship, health, happiness, intellectual 
stimulation, beauty, the respect of one’s peers, a 
sense of community, all these and more are measured 
by no economic indicator and, consequently, fig­
ure not at all in the calculation of Gross National 
Product. Economic goals are but intermediate goals 
to the attainment of these truly basic ends, and the 
suitability of economic goals ought to be judged ac­
cordingly.
A third basic premise is that many worthwhile 
things that can be measured in economic terms are 
either already provided in ways that make no de­
mand on nonrenewable resources, or conceivably 
could be. I would put most educational services 
in this category, along with most health services; 
art, literature, music, and drama; housing; outdoor 
recreation; and a variety of services such as social 
work, counseling, family planning, probation and 
parole, and judicial review.
A fourth premise is that many other worthwhile 
things that can be measured in economic terms and 
that do require nonrenewable resources could (with 
a little incentive and effort) be provided not only in 
ways that would lessen the rate at which nonrenewable 
resources are used, but also in ways that would 
involve less harmful effects for the environment.
— Paper first presented at: Symposium on the Problems of 
Economic Growth, Lehigh University, Bethlehem, Pennsyl­
vania. October 17-19, 1972.
* The views and opinions expressed in this paper are those 
of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the 
United Nations.
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There are a variety of means to this end. They in­
clude a more efficient use of materials in manu­
facture; the use of better varieties of seed and live­
stock and the application of practices more con­
ducive to the conservation of land and water; better 
storage practices; and the recycling of metals and 
other materials, as was accomplished on such a 
wide scale on the home front during World War II.1
Transportation offers particularly wide-ranging 
possibilities on this score. Just think of what could 
be gained for both the environment and the quality 
of life if we stopped building roads and eliminated 
the private automobile as a means of mass transit. 
Or, on a lesser scale, think of the reduction in 
noise pollution that would come from a curfew on 
aircraft landings and takeoffs during the hours 
when most people are trying to sleep—something now 
in effect in both Australia and Washington, D.C. 
The control of insects through greater variety in land 
use and crop planning instead of pesticides is an­
other example. Still another is the prohibition of non- 
returnable on non-biodegradable containers for food 
and drink, and of plastics and metal foils for packing.
As for those worthwhile things that do require 
nonrenewable resources, there would seem to be a 
number of possibilities for improvements in quality 
and efficiency that would actually result in a lower 
rate of economic growth than that now associated 
with the provision of these goods and services. The 
substitution of mass transit systems for private au­
tomobiles, and of nondisposable containers for dispos­
able ones, are two examples.
I take it, therefore, that when we proclaim the de­
sirability (or even the necessity) for a zero economic- 
growth rate, what we have in mind is a zero economic 
growth insofar as the use of nonrenewable resources 
is concerned. The possible moral gains from Spartan 
simplicity I shall leave to the discussion of others. 
Economic growth in certain areas is still possible 
without additional consumption of nonrenewable re­
sources; such growth is still desirable, especially with 
respect to the provision of the basic necessities of 
life in some of the underdeveloped countries—allow­
ing, of course, for cultural differences. The point 
is to achieve these particular kinds of growth at the
1. In this connection, see Kenneth E. Boulding, «The Eco­
nomics of the Coming Spaceship Earth», in Henry Jarrett 
(ed.), Environmental Quality in a Growing Economy (Balti­
more: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966). Also see the 
following sophisticated and broad-gauged discussions by Her­
man E. Daly: «Toward a Stationary Economy», in John Harte 
and Robert E. Socolow (eds.), Patient Earth, (New York: 
Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1971); «The Stationary-State 
Economy», The Ecologist, July 1972; and «On the Transition 
to a Steady-State Economy», in Herman E. Daly (ed.), Toward 
a Steady-State Economy (San Fransisco: W.H. Freeman, 
1973) (forthcoming).
least cost and with the greatest gain in terms of en­
vironmental and human well-being. One element of 
this would obviously be the simultaneous achievement 
of a cessation of certain other kinds of growth; 
namely, those that have deleterious social and ecolo­
gical side effects. But zero economic growth itself is 
not necessarily to be equated with the absence of 
economic and social change.
consequences of zero economic growth
What, then, might be the consequences for human 
society of a zero economic-growth rate? Let me note 
four basic considerations to help put the question in 
proper context.
First, it is often assumed that the consequences of 
a zero growth rate will be so pervasive that the so­
cieties with that characteristic will all display an es­
sential sameness. Yet, on the basis of what is known 
of such societies (e.g., the medieval feudal societies 
of Europe, nonindustrialized tribal societies studied 
by anthropologists, and even the world’s industrial­
ized societies during much of the present century), 
it would seem at least possible for zero population 
growth to coexist with a considerable variety of so­
cial conditions. The nature of these social conditions 
would seem, in fact, to depend far more on the con­
text in which this zero economic growth occurs (on 
the political, social, and demographic milieu, for exam­
ple) than on the condition of zero economic growth 
itself.
So far as the distribution of wealth is concerned, 
societies with zero growth rates could conceivably 
range from a state of considerable equality to one 
of gross inequality. However, at the international lev­
el, equality among different countries would seem 
highly unlikely. This would also be true of the dis­
tribution of power, in large part because of the de­
pendence of power on wealth.
Second, a zero overall economic-growth rate would 
not seem to preclude the existence of considerable 
variety in the rates of change for the various sectors 
of economic and social activity. These different rates 
of change would have different consequences, of 
course, depending on the different social and eco­
nomic conditions in which they obtained.
Third, it is doubtful if zero economic growth could 
proceed for very long in the face of continued pop­
ulation growth. For population growth to continue 
simultaneously with zero economic growth, food pro­
duction would have to account for an even greater 
share of total production. The ultimate result would 
be an economy of the merest substance. Particularly 
if the population could remember having earlier ex­
perienced a higher-than-subsistance level, the result 
of continued population increase in conjunction with
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a zero economic-growth rate would likely be consider­
able social unrest. In any case, zero population 
growth is a desirable goal in itself—and an inevitable 
eventuality, regardless of the rate of economic growth. 
Barring mass emigration (assuming there would be 
someplace to go), there are only two paths to its 
attainment: higher mortality or lower fertility. Many 
of the apparent consequences of zero economic growth 
are really ascribable to the effects from zero 
population growth. However, these effects will dif­
fer in response to such factors as the existing eco­
nomic and social system, the size of the population 
at the point when zero growth is achieved, the degree 
of dispersion or concentration of population, and 
whether zero population growth is maintained essen­
tially through low birth rates or high death rates.
Fourth and finally, it is absolutely essential that 
in discussing the likely consequences of a zero eco­
nomic-growth rate, we deal separately with industrial­
ized and nonindustrialized societies.
In short, zero economic growth would seem to be 
possible under a variety of living conditions and so­
cial systems; the causal relationships between a zero 
economic-growth rate and various conditions of life 
are by no means either very obvious or necessarily 
very clear-cut or straightforward. In the long run, 
and probably in the short run as well, a zero econo­
mic-growth rate will necessitate a zero or even nega­
tive population-growth rate. Finally, the consequences 
of a zero economic-growth rate in industrialized 
countries are likely to be significantly different from 
those in nonindustrialized societies.
Although we can make some probable predictions, 
there is certainly enough possible variety in the an­
swers to make the question of the social consequen­
ces of a zero economic-growth rate an intellectually 
intriguing one, whatever the practical implications of 
the answers. Moreover, there is a measure of safe­
ty afforded the prophet in the fact that no one is 
likely to be in a position to check on the accuracy 
of his prophecies. Not only are the causal relation­
ships very complex, but zero economic growth will, 
I am afraid, be a long time in coming. It may, in 
fact, be so long in coming that the resource base 
it is intended to save will have been affected (even 
used up) to a degree beyond salvation.
the industrialized countries
Given this pessimistic outlook, what can we say 
about the likely consequences of a zero economic- 
growth rate in the industrialized (i.e., «developed») 
countries? Let us begin with the industrialized coun­
tries because the social changes associated with at­
taining a zero growth rate are likely to be of great­
er magnitude and social pervasiveness in these coun­
168
tries than in the nonindustrialized countries. One 
should not minimize the emotional difficulties that 
may be associated with rejection of the growth ethic 
in both affluent and non-affluent societies. The idea 
that further economic growth will alleviate the prob­
lems of the poor in industrialized countries and of 
society in general in the nonindustrialized ones seems 
widely held and has been systematically encouraged 
by a variety of persons and agencies. But the perva­
siveness of this idea is probably markedly different 
between the two sets of societies. Certainly there are 
marked differences between them in the levels of 
growth contemplated.
Of the several ways in which the likely consequen­
ces of a zero economic-growth rate might be pre­
sented, I have chosen here to list them according 
to four, not altogether separate, general categories 
of relationships, as follows: social structure, person­
ality traits, interpersonal relations, and conditions 
of life.
the effect on society’s social structure
What effect zero economic growth will have on a 
society’s social structure will essentially depend on 
the value that society places on equality in the dis­
tribution of goods and services, and also on the 
extent to which there exists in that society an 
equality of power—power not only over others, but 
also over the social forces that affect one’s life and 
well-being. Are Americans and the Swiss, for exam­
ple, any happier, any «better off» now than in, say, 
1950 when their «real» incomes were substantially 
lower? To improve the lot of people in the affluent 
countries, do we need more economic growth or 
do we need instead a more equitable distribution of 
wealth? It would seem to me that, in the absence of 
amore equitable distribution of wealth, further eco­
nomic growth in these countries would offer little in 
the way of social benefit—and it would actually make 
matters a good deal worse.
There is no shortage of proponents of further 
growth, however. A frequently offered argument for 
continued economic growth is that it permits improve­
ments in the lot of the poor without altering rel­
ative social positions. However, as the pie grows 
larger, the proportionate shares remain the same and, 
though seldom mentioned, the discrepancy in gross 
amounts becomes ever greater. Presidential advisor, 
Daniel P. Moynihan put the case succinctly in a re­
port to President Nixon:
There is every reason to be concerned about the costs of eco­
nomic growth, and (the) need for a balanced national growth 
policy... But this is quite a different thing from proclaiming 
the immediate necessity to put an end to growth... In... gen­
eral terms, how much sense would this make for society, given 
the great stabilizing role of economic growth which makes it
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possible to increase the incomes of less well off groups in the 
population without having to decrease the incomes of others?1
Though the adherents of such a view seem still 
in the majority among the holders of political and 
economic power, at least in the United States, I get 
the impression that the social and ecological cost of 
policies embodying such a view is becoming increas­
ingly obvious. These include the social and econo­
mic cost of the status frustration and money wor­
ries these policies entail for the majority whose in­
comes never quite reach a comfortable level; the ba­
sic injustice embodied in the obvious divorce of reward 
from merit and of the social return from social con­
tribution; and, in recent years, the fact that such a 
system of rewards (and, conversely of punishments) 
entails so much environmental loss in the form of 
ever greater consumption of ever scarcer resources on 
the part of those in the most favored economic po­
sitions. As I summarized it in an article published 
over a dozen years ago:
no group in... society can repay all of the social costs entail­
ed by its excess reproduction—the rich probably least of all, 
for their style of life requires a much higher consumption of 
those very things upon which population increase, in whatever 
class, replaces a premium: raw materials and space.2 3
An affluent society can take several paths to great­
er social equality: greater equalization of incomes; 
distribution of a greater proportion of goods and 
services outside the market system (e.g., health and 
medical care, recreation, retirement benefits, school­
ing, transportation, and housing); or limiting what 
the rich can do with their money (preventing owner­
ship of seashore and lake front property, and cur­
tailing the use of automobiles, for example).
However, there is no necessary causal relation­
ship between zero economic growth and any of these 
procedures. It is quite possible for an affluent society 
to have a large proportion of its population at a 
position two or three rungs above the bottom, and 
in no mood to make common cause with those below 
them. This part of the population is quite capable of 
reacting to zero economic growth, at least for a 
while, by endeavoring to distinguish their position 
even more clearly from that of those deemed their 
social «inferiors». We see this in the German lower 
middle class’s early receptivity to Nazism8 and in the
1. Daniel P. Moynihan, «Counsellor’s Statement», in Na­
tional Goals Research Staff, Toward Balanced Growth'. Quan­
tity and Quality (Washington: US Government Printing 
Office, 1970), p. 12.
2. Lincoln H. Day, «The American Fertility Cult», Colum­
bia University Forum, Summer 1960.
3. Hans Gerth, «The Nazi Party: Its Leadership and Compo­
sition», American Journal of Sociology, January 1940; Franz
United States today, in the union restrictions on mi­
nority-group membership and the opposition to bus­
ing on behalf of greater educational opportunities 
for minority-group children. Nor is there any dearth 
of evidence to demonstrate that even in a political 
democracy, those at the top of the power structure 
can be fully capable of manipulating public opinion 
and voting behavior to their own ends over extended 
periods of time.
Nonetheless, I should expect that zero economic 
growth would generally be more conducive to social 
equality than to social inequality, particularly in a 
political democracy. For one thing, there would be 
less with which to «buy off» the have-less portion of 
the population. For another, there would be less need 
for capital formation on behalf of future growth; 
and, therefore, at least the possibility of allocating 
a greater share of national income to such things as 
pensions. If this were done, it would cut down consid­
erably on those instances of income inequality (no­
tably in such affluent countries as the United States, 
the Federal Republic of Germany, and Australia), 
where the aged occupy a particularly disadvantaged 
economic position.4 A further reason is the likelihood 
of greater equality of wealth as a result of fewer op­
portunities for rapid advance in position or income 
as a consequence of stock market or real estate spec­
ulation, or of association with a rapidly growing 
industry of production process. Finally, there is the 
age structure of a stationary population. If mortality 
levels are reasonably low, such a population will offer 
little opportunity for promotion before age fifty or 
fifty-five, except as a consequence of business^x- 
pansion, which, of course, would be less likely in 
a zero-growth economy. This could, of course, re­
sult for a time in heightened competition (and, 
consequently, heightened frustration); however, even­
tually one should expect aspirations to conform more 
closely to actual opportunities, especially if there is 
little advertising and little general economic expan­
sion.5
A further consequence of zero economic growth
Neumann, Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National 
Socialism (New York: 1942).
4. US Department of Health, Education, and Welfare,
Social Security Administration, Office of Research and Sta­
tistics, Research Report No. 40, Social Security Programs 
throughout the World, 1971 (Washington: US Printing
Office, 1972); A.J. Jaffe, «Retirement: A Cloudy Future», 
Industrial Gerontology, Summer 1972, Chapter 5; Michael 
Harrington, The Other America (New York: Macmillan, 
1963), Chapter 6; «Have-nots of the 'Economic Miracle’», 
London Times, July 21, 1972.
5. Lincoln H. Day, «The Social Consequences of a Zero 
Population Growth Rate in the United States», in US 
Commission on Population Growth and the American Future, 
Beport (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1972) 
(forthcoming).
m
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for the social structure would be the changes in 
the composition of the work force as a result of 
the changes in the composition of output. Certainly 
one element in attaining a zero-growth economy 
would be the pruning back of industries geared to 
growth (machine tools and engines, advertising, 
steel, stock markets, and some types of construc­
tion) and a corresponding increase in the service 
sector: maintenance and repair and various pro­
fessional and semiprofessional services. An increase 
in the proportion of the work force employed in 
agriculture is also likely if there is, as one would 
expect, a return to more labor-intensive methods; and 
also improvements in pensions of a sort that would 
enable more of the aged to remain on (or return to) 
farms where they could be at least partially occu­
pied and could also grow some of their own feed 
fiber.
As the archetypical industry of the affluent, 
growthoriented economy, advertising would, in a non­
growth economy, occupy a position of little signif­
icance; for the main tasks of advertising (product 
differentiation and the creation of needs1) would be 
of little importance. For much the same reasons, 
there should be a decline in the number of salesmen, 
though not necessarily of salesclerks and shopkeep­
ers, in the numbers engaged in packaging and com­
mercial design, and in those employed with the me­
dia of mass communication. The creative energies 
of those people, now so highly mobilized in further­
ance of the growth ethic, will simply have to be 
applied to activities more in keeping with the human 
anà ecological necessity of no-growth.
As previously stated, there would be an increase 
in the numbers employed as maintenance and re­
pair workers, as agricultural workers, and in the 
provision of a great variety of personal and social 
services, from birth control to homemaking, from 
tailoring and dressmaking to day care and super­
vision of parole and probation. It is in the expansion 
of such services (and corresponding contraction 
of manufacturing) that a zero economic-growth rate 
will have its greatest impact on the occupational 
structure of the society.
The changes in industrial and occupational com­
position would contribute to changes in the pat­
terns of settlement as well. Under conditions of 
zero economic growth, we could expect the popula­
tion to be less highly urbanized, and the urban por­
tion of the population to be less concentrated in the 
very large metropolitan centers. (Note that it is 
proportions I am talking about here not members; 
anticipated population increases are unlikely to
1. David M. Potter, People of Plenty (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1954), Chapter 8.
permit much reduction in the actual numbers living 
in the already existing large agglomerations.)
Under conditions of zero economic growth, there 
would be less economic need for large concentra­
tions of workers; and if the forecasted changes in 
pension systems and agricultural methods take place, 
there would also be more living on the land. Accom­
panied by greater general equality in the distri­
bution of income, an increaseTn the proportion on the 
land could be a factor in providing the economic 
base necessary to settlement of a higher proportion 
of the population in the smaller towns and cities.
What the consequences of a zero economic-growth 
rate might be for another feature of social structure, 
the delineation of male and female roles, is a bit 
difficult to foresee. If there is greater income equality 
(and particularly if this equality arises more from 
equality of wages than from progressive taxation), 
I would expect a less rigid division of occupations 
into «men’s work» and «women’s work». On the 
other hand, because the newer occupations have 
customarily provided more employment opportuni­
ties to women than have the older (unless marked 
by significantly lower pay rates), a slowing down 
of economic expansion could result in a greater 
rigidity of job definition according to sex.2 The ef­
fects of this might be compensated for by the ex­
pansion of the service sector; however, there is 
no assurance that rigid categorization by sex would 
not occur there as well.
the industrialised countries—personality traits
Let me turn now to consideration of the effect 
of a zero economic-growth rate on the distribu­
tion of personality traits. There are a number of 
possibilities.
There should be an eventual decline in the emphasis 
on «getting ahead».3 The desire for a second job 
and the readiness to accept overtime work, for exam­
ple, are features of an economy characterized not 
so much by abundance as by the unequal distri­
bution of wealth and the anticipation of economic 
growth.
At the same time, there should be a development of 
a more positive attitude toward work itself. What 
is undertaken would presumably be of more obvious 
use, and also more likely to have developed in re­
sponse to a genuine demand and not merely a created 
one. (There could still be some advertising to create
2. Theodore Caplow, The Sociology of Work (Mineapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1954), Chapter 10.
3. See in this connection, A. J. Jaffe, «Retirement: A Cloudy 
Future», op. cit., pp. 76-77, and also A.J.Jaffe, The Middle 
Years: Too Young Nor Too Old, special issue of Industrial 
Gerontology, September 1971, Chapter 10.
170
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 03:39:59 |
social consequences of zero economic growth
demand for certain goods and services; but, as al­
ready noted, advertising and zero economic growth 
are essentially incompatible.) Moreover, the worker, 
at least in manufacturing, could be expected to take 
pride in his produce because quality and durability 
rather than style and obsolescence would have been 
emphasized in its manufacture.1 And finally, the 
individual worker would play a larger role in the 
total product process and acquire a greater sense of 
identity with the result of his labors. A zero-growth 
economy, particularly if combined with a more 
equal distribution of wealth, would seemingly offer 
less incentive to substitute machine work for hand­
work or to apply the more markedly dehuman­
izing techniques of minute specialization.
In a zero growth economy, work could come to be 
considered less as simply a means to an end and more 
as an end in itself. This would be especially true if 
the work situation afforded opportunity for crea­
tivity and for the development of emotionally satis­
fying relations with one’s associates. Though these 
opportunities have always characterized many jobs, 
even in highly industrialized economies, the tendency 
toward this sort of thing would be considerably en­
hanced by a lessened emphasis on «efficiency» 
and specialization in the production process, by a 
lower level of material aspiration, and by a lessening 
of competition with one’s fellow workers.
Along with these changes in attitudes toward work 
and toward getting ahead, the members of a zero 
economic-growth society would probably also be 
less inept outside their jobs than their counterparts 
in societies characterized by economic growth.2 
The decline of specialization would be a factor here; 
so would the greater experience with repairing things 
-instead of throwing them away, and possibly, also, 
with producing things for oneself—furniture, clothes, 
toys, and canned goods, for example.
There would be a greater feeling of being able to 
cope. Part of this would be due to the development 
of a wider range of skills. It would also arise from 
the greater stability, the greater predictability, of 
a zero-growth society, and from the fact that in 
such a society there would be less likelihood of per­
sonal frustration, whether from thwarted ambi­
tion or merely commuter traffic jams.
Unless counterbalanced by the pressure of pop­
ulation on resources, the members of a zero-growth 
society would be less imbued with the man-versus- 
nature attitude that underlies the exploitative growth 
economy.3 A zero-growth economy would appear to 
offer little support for the view that man’s duty
1. Paul Goodman, Growing Up Absurd (New York:Random 
House, 1960), pp. 17-22.
2. Ibid., pp. 71-79.
3. Kenneth Boulding, op. cit.
is to bend nature to his will rather than learning to 
live with it.
Finally, the person reared in a condition of zero 
economic growth could be expected to place little 
emphasis on growth and bigness as desirable in 
themselves, and also on the desirability of «change» 
and «newness». Not for them the unquestioned as­
sumption that what is new is naturally better.
interpersonal relations
In the area of interpersonal relations, I should 
expect the major consequence of zero economic 
growth to be a greater sense of community. A num­
ber of factors would contribute: Because private 
means would be in shorter supply and so much 
more expensive, we could expect a greater sharing 
of equipment (from lawn mowers and washing ma­
chines to farm machinery and public transporta­
tion) with all the possibilities this would offer 
for informal, psychically rewarding interperson­
al contact. There is much more potential for the 
development of community in doing the wash in a 
laundromat than doing it in the basement.4 Another 
factor would be the informal mixing of different age 
groups and social classes which would derive from 
such sharing, particularly of public transportation. 
As A.E. Parr has pointed out, it is much more dif­
ficult to think of someone as alien, of a different 
species to be feared or even despised, if you see him 
every day on the bus.5 And as Edward T. Hall has 
written:
Automobiles insulate man not only from the environment 
but from human contact as well. Theyt permit only the most 
limited types of interaction, usually competitive, aggressive, 
and destructive. If people are to be brought together again, 
given a chance to get acquainted with each other and involv­
ed in nature, some fundamental solutions must be found to 
the problems posed by the automobile.6
Today, eight out of ten American workers go to 
work in a private automobile, and for three-fourths 
of them it’s a case of one whole automobile encap­
sulating but one rugged individualist behind the 
wheel.7 Little chance, there, for human contact even 
of a merely visual sort.
A greater sense of community would also be stim­
ulated by more labor-intensive work processes and 
a lesser degree of specialization, both of which would
4. See, for example, «Launderettes», Which!, July 1967 
(published by the Consumers Association, United Kingdom).
5. A.E. Parr, «Urbanity and the Urban Scene», Landscape, 
Spring 1967.
6. Edward T. Hall, The Hidden Dimension (GardenCity, 
New York: Doubleday, 1966), p. 177.
7. New York Times (report on the 1970 census), October 
15, 1972.
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be at least partially supported by the need to share 
equipment. It would also follow from the lesser em­
phasis on individual competition that would be a 
likely consequence of zero economic growth. There 
might still be ample room for competition in the 
development of invidious distinctions of status 
(like those so frequently observed in anthropologi­
cal studies),1 but in a condition of no-growth such 
distinctions would necessarily extend over a much 
narrower range.
Finally, a greater sense of community should arise 
because a zero economic-growth rate would pro­
duce less individual mobility (both social and geo­
graphic) and also less community change, par­
ticularly of the type forced upon an area by specu­
lative investment and road-building. With less eco­
nomic development and less speculation, people could 
be expected to remain longer in their communities 
and individual places of residence. They would thus 
have at least the opportunity to develop greater loyalty 
to the community and a greater sense of identity 
with it. And, of course, there would be much less 
incentive to think of home ownership as nothing but 
a speculative investment.
Less crime and delinquency would occur under con­
ditions of zero economic growth. Affluence has fre­
quently led to the loss of familiar ways and surround­
ings and to the creation of artificial distinctions 
within society and of higher aspirations productive 
of nothing but individual frustration. Without going 
into the theory of the causation of crime and delin­
quency, I should expect that anything that resulted 
in a greater sense of community, more predictability, 
less advertising, and more demonstrably worth­
while work would result in markedly less crime and 
delinquency.
For much the same reasons, we might forecast less 
industrial strife in a no-growth economy, though 
we must recognize that it is not necessary to have 
equality of social power in order to have stability 
of social relationships. There is nothing inherently 
unstable about social inequality.
Finally, as far as interpersonal relations are con­
cerned, zero economic growth should lead to less 
conflict between generations: because there would 
be less change and, therefore, more predictability 
and continuity; because there would be more sharing 
of activities among the generations and more joint 
participation in the life of the society; and because 
there would be less advertising and less commercially 
oriented programming in the media of mass communi­
cation to create alternatives, age-specific «life styles».
1. James West, Plainville, USA (New York: Columbia Uni­
versity Press, 1945), Chapter 3 ; Allison Davis, Burleigh B. Gard­
ner, and Mary R. Gardner, Deep South (Chicago: Univer­
sity of Chicago Press, 1941), Chapter 3 and 10.
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conditions of life
With respect to conditions of life, it is possible 
to note a large number of likely changes that 
would attend achievement of a zero economic growth 
rate.
We can expect, for one thing, a substantial change 
in patterns of work: a shift to short work days, to 
part-time work, or to working only part of the year; 
none of which need necessarily mean more leisure, 
however, as the time saved from work could be mere­
ly transferred to lengthier commuting.
Yet it is possible that the time spent on the job 
could remain much the same because the lower to­
tal output necessary to zero economic growth would 
be attained through the use of «less productive» 
methods, such as substituting labor for capital and 
de-emphasizing minute specialization.
One would forecast more emphasis on preserva­
tion and conservation, whether of land or old build­
ings, although population pressure may reach 
such extremes in some countries as to prevent any 
real halt in the drift to total environmental decay.
In some sectors of the economy, zero growth would 
reduce consumer choice in clothing, food, and con­
sumer durables. But in others, such as recreation 
and the availability of public transportation, a zero 
economy might offer a wider choice.
Even with the development of solar and tidal 
sources of energy, a zero-growth economy would, by 
definition, involve a lower consumption of energy— 
industrially and commercially, and also within in­
dividual households. At the level of daily living, this 
would take such forms as the disappearance of 
the private automobile, the heating of water only for 
immediate use, less central heating, and less air 
conditioning.
Despite such inconveniences, I should expect life 
in a zero-growth economy to be generally more 
comfortable than it is now.
Along with other factors already mentioned, there 
would be less air and water pollution, and less waste 
disposal, although population increases could in 
both instances cancel the gains inherent in zero 
economic growth. There should be considerably 
less noise pollution because there would be fewer 
cars and airplanes and fewer trucks hauling car­
goes of disposable obsolete goods. Public transpor­
tation would be more prominent, and traffic jams 
less. With less forced obsolescence, with a greater 
emphasis on durability in manufacturing and on ease 
of repair, and with a larger proportion of the work 
force engaged in repair and maintenance, there 
would be fewer breakdowns of equipment and less 
waiting for repairs. And there would be more pos­
sibilities for an attractive environment—the result
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social consequences of zero economic growth,
of less advertising, fewer motor vehicles, less need 
for rapid construction (because population would 
have ceased to increase, and a zero rate of economic 
growth would require less internal migration), and 
less incentive to destroy the old to make way for 
the new. A return to «less efficient» methods of 
production might well have as one of its first con­
sequences a decided improvement in the aesthetic 
quality of houses and buildings.
the nonindustrialized countries
Now let me turn briefly to the nonindustrialized 
countries. Zero economic growth here would in­
volve much less extensive or pervasive changes. 
Most of these countries are not presently far remov­
ed from zero economic growth. Were they to attain 
it now, they would do so at a largely subsistence level. 
However, in some instances this level of living has 
approached the idyllic. Here, for example, is Fran­
ces FitzGerald’s description of conditions in pre­
war Vietnam villages:
For traditional Vietnamese, the sense of limitation and 
enclosure was a part of individual life as much as life of the 
nation. In what is today northern and central Vietnam, the 
single form of Vietnamese settlement duplicated the closed 
circle of the nation. Hidden from sight behind high hedges of 
bamboo, the villages stood like nuclei within their encircling 
rice fields. For the villages, as for the nation, the amount 
of arable land was absolutely inelastic. The population of the 
village remained stable, and so to accumulate wealth was to 
deprive the rest of the community of land, to fatten while 
one’s neighbor starved. Vietnam is no longer a closed econom­
ic system, but the idea remains with many Vietnamese that 
great wealth is anti-social—not a sign of success, but a sign 
of selfishness.
With a stable technology and a limited amount of land, 
the traditional Vietnamese lived by constant repetition, by 
the sowing and reaping of rice and by the perpetuation of 
customary law... In this passage of time that had no histo­
ry, the death of a man marked no real end. Buried in the 
rice fields that sustained his family, the father would live 
on in the bodies of his children and grandchildren. As time 
wrapped around itself, the generations to come would 
regard him as the source of their present lives and the arbi­
ter of their fate. In this continuum of the family, «private 
property» did not exist, for the father was less an owner than 
a trustee of the land to be passed on to his children. To the 
Vietnamese, and land itself was the sacred, constant element: 
the people flowed over the land like water, maintaining and 
fructifying it for the generations to come.1
Unfortunately, such conditions are fast disappearing 
in the face of contact with other cultures and of 
rapid population increases. Elsewhere in the nonindus­
trialized world, life may be more appropriately char­
acterized as «nasty, brutish, and short». Few of 
these societies can, as yet, really afford zero econo-
1. Frances FitzGerald, «Fire in the Lake», Part I, New 
Yorker, July 1, 1972, p. 38.
mie growth—if only because of political considera­
tions. By almost any criterion, most of them offer 
much room for improvement in living conditions; 
«improvement» presumably in terms of their own 
cultures and aspirations, and not just in terms of 
some Western viewpoint. They are in need of better 
nutrition, health care, birth control, and housing; 
and in many instances, also, of jobs and of more 
opportunities for people to play a meaningful role 
in society.
Quite a part from any considerations either of 
justice or of the politics inherent in the enormous 
discrepancies in levels of living that separate the in­
dustrialized from the nonindustrialized lands, most 
of the latter will require massive assistance from the 
former, if only to hold the line against further de­
predations. In general, these countries lack the social 
base (e.g., in schooling and productive agriculture) 
necessary to economic development and are, in most 
instances, further disadvantaged by a youthful age 
structure and rapid rates of population increase.
Essentially, the achievement of zero economic 
growth in these currently nonindustrialized countries 
would preclude their ever becoming industrialized. 
With a goal of zero economic growth, their efforts 
to increase productivity would presumably be chan­
neled into the production of food and services, 
rather than into activities that would yield revenue 
for the purchase of goods manufactured from nonre­
newable resources.
There is at least a theoretical opportunity for these 
countries to grow because they have, for the most 
part, proceeded such a short way along the road to in­
dustrialization. But this would seem, in most cases, 
to be more than outweighed by a number of other 
attributes. Most of the nonindustrialized countries 
have but limited resources, even if the goal of devel­
opment is merely of a strictly nonindustrial sort. 
Moreover, many have large populations, and all are 
experiencing rapid population increases—with no mi­
gratory outlets and every indication that these in­
creases will continue many decades into the future. 
And thus far these countries give little evidence of 
experiencing social changes of a sort conducive to 
attainment of a reduction in fertility levels commen­
surate with the need to halt population increase. 
There is a very practical question here: given the 
desirability of better health and greater longevity 
(and, thus, of lower mortality rates), how much, and 
what kind of, social chance is necessary to produce 
a willingness to limit family size to the degree neces­
sary to keep this low-mortality population stationary? 
Is industrialization now a requisite? We have some 
clues, even if we don’t know the answer for certain; it 
takes only a look at the statistics to see that, what­
ever changes, they are not occuring fast enough to
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forestall continuing massive population increases 
many years into the future. Yet the prospect for any 
improvement in living conditions hinges very signif­
icantly upon when, how, and at what numerical levels 
the nonindustrialized countries finally succeed in re­
ducing the birth rates to the levels of death rates.
conclusion
A zero economic-growth rate offers the possibili­
ty of a better life in the currently industrialized coun­
tries; and certainly conditions in these countries have 
already reached a point beyond which the possibili­
ties for improvement by means of further economic 
growth are virtually nil. For the nonindustrialized 
countries, however, there is less certainty about this 
except, of course, in the long run. Any decline in 
the extent of that dualism that separates the rich 
from the poor, both among nations and within them, 
is to be applauded.1 But large international differ­
ences in living conditions will doubtless remain. 
Will this be a source of frustration and, therefore, 
of social and political disruption in the less indus­
trialized countries? With communication as devel­
1. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs, 1970 Report on the World Social Situation (New 
York: 1971). pp. xi and 66 (Table 12).
oped as it now is, this kind of frustration can hardly 
be avoided; nevertheless, it need not lead inevitably 
to social disorder. Any reduction in the living-stan­
dard gap would probably help, especially if in the 
nonindustrialized countries this were accompanied in 
ways that left the basic elements of their cultures 
relatively intact as a cushion to fall back on, while 
in the more affluent countries it involved an actual 
reduction in material levels of living.
Differences in international power are bound to 
continue. The attainment of zero economic growth 
will help to reduce these differences, but there will 
always be the possibility that the leaders of coun­
tries with more power will be able to divert economic 
and social processes within these countries away from 
the maintenance of zero economic growth and in to 
economic growth on behalf of some military adven­
ture instead. We will thus continue to need inter­
national organizations for the settlement of differ­
ences and for the keeping of the peace, whatever the 
likely economic situation. However, the task of such 
organizations might be far easier under conditions 
of zero economic growth. There will be less social 
and economic room for maneuver on behalf of mil­
itary action, and it will be far more difficult for a 
government to divert its people’s dislike of a policy 
of military aggrandizement and carnage by appealing 
to their fears about losses of jobs or cuts in person­
al income.
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